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Introduction and summary
Home prices have been in the news a lot lately. In 
particular, some observers fear that the swift increase 
in prices during the early part of the new century may 
have constituted a housing price bubble.1 This con-
cern has been prompted primarily by the rapidity of 
the rise, both compared with previous years and rela-
tive to growth in rents.2 The home price increases, how-
ever, occurred during a period of rising incomes and 
falling mortgage rates. The changes in both income and 
mortgage rates made housing more affordable and 
should therefore have led to higher home prices, all 
else being equal. In this article, we document changes 
in prices for the country as a whole and for many major 
markets. We examine whether changes in the economy, 
including income and mortgage rates, are enough to ex-
plain home price changes, both nationally and locally. 
To determine whether there has been a bubble—
and whether the bubble is bursting—we need to know 
what home prices “should” be. We use data from 1980 
through (midyear) 2006 to create a simple reduced-
form model of single-family home prices. Our focus 
is on the relationship between home prices and mort-
gages rates. We use a metric that measures the fraction 
of income necessary to cover the mortgage payments 
on a home. We find that this metric helps explain 
home prices and that, as expected, falling mortgage 
rates are associated with higher prices.
Our sample period includes times when home 
prices were growing rapidly and times when they 
were not. One focus of this article is to determine 
whether the past few years are truly different from 
prior years, that is, whether there is a housing bubble, 
either in the nation as a whole or in selected markets. 
As noted, in recent years, home prices have increased 
more than rents. We show that they have also in-
creased relative to changes in mortgage rates and in-
come. When we estimate our regression model, we 
find that, on average, home prices are above their pre-
dicted levels in the post-1999 part of our sample. How-
ever, this result does not hold true uniformly across the 
country. Markets on the coasts, especially those in 
California, Florida, and the Northeast, have prices 
significantly above predicted levels. Some other markets 
have prices below predicted levels. Thus, to the extent 
that prices have been overheating, the phenomenon is 
limited to some markets, many of which have tradition-
ally exhibited volatile prices. Still, if factors such as 
the recent increases in mortgage rates cause prices to 
move toward their predicted levels, there could be 
significant corrections on the horizon in some markets.
When we focus on the Seventh Federal Reserve 
District,3 we find little evidence of a housing price 
bubble. Home prices in the larger markets in the  
Seventh District show some volatility, but are gener-
ally in line with other markets in the interior of the 
country. In the smaller markets, home prices have  
not deviated much from their predicted values.
Background
Figure 1 charts the median sale price of an exist-
ing U.S. single-family home over the last 36 years 
(all dollar values are in constant 2006 dollars).4 Over 
the period, prices were generally increasing, except 
for several years in the early 1980s. The median home 
price was $118,500 in 1972. It increased to $148,700 
in late 1980 before high mortgage rates and inflation 
pushed prices down. Prices fell through 1984, reaching 
a minimum of $131,400 near the end of that year. 
There then was a period of moderate price increases 
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from 1984 through 1994, with prices increasing at a 
1.2 percent annual rate. After that, prices increased at 
an accelerating pace through 2000, rising at 2.1 per-
cent per year; at the end of 2000, the median home 
price was $169,400. This increase was similar to that 
of the 1970s. But starting around the turn of the cen-
tury, the rise in home prices really began to accelerate. 
Prices went up at an annual rate of 7.9 percent from 
the end of 2000 to their peak of $238,600 in June 
2005. Some believe that the rapid increase in housing 
prices is a sign of a bubble.5 From June 2005 through 
August 2006, prices fell 6.6 percent, which some saw 
as the beginning of the end of the alleged bubble.6
As a first pass at determining whether prices are 
too high, we can break the value of owning a home 
into two parts. An owner-occupied house combines a 
flow of services with an investment good. The home-
owner gets to live in the house in lieu of renting a simi-
lar unit and also gets a potential return on the equity 
in the house. In a stable market, the return on home 
equity should parallel that of other investments with  
a similar risk profile. That is, one should compare the 
sum of the return plus the rental value of living in the 
home to the return on other similarly risky investments. 
One way to decompose the change in home prices 
into the rental equivalent portion and the return on 
equity portion is to compare home prices with rental 
prices. We use the owners’ equivalent rent component 
of the Consumer Price Index (henceforth, CPI-OER) 
as a proxy for the stream of earnings 
from renting a house.7 The ratio of the 
median sale price of an existing single-
family home to CPI-OER gives a picture 
of home buyers’ expectations of price ap-
preciation on their purchases. This is, in 
essence, a price-to-earnings ratio (Leamer, 
2002). Home prices rising much faster 
than the stream of rental income could be 
a sign that a bubble is forming, or at least 
that prices are rising faster than funda-
mentals.
Figure 1 compares the evolution of 
the CPI-OER since its inception in 1983 
with that of home prices. As the figure 
shows, home prices and the rental index 
moved together until the late 1990s. At 
that point, the rate of increase in prices 
began to exceed the change in the rent in-
dex by a substantial margin. Even so, this 
shift may be misleading, since housing 
markets are by their nature local, and ex-
amining national trends can miss impor-
tant differences across markets. Indeed, 
prices vary significantly between localities. To illus-
trate, figure 2 graphs the median sale price of an ex-
isting single-family home in San Francisco, Chicago, 
and Kansas City, three major metropolitan markets 
(where markets are metropolitan statistical areas, or 
MSAs). Prices went up in all three markets, but not at 
the same rate. Home prices in Chicago rose at a 0.8 
percent annual rate through 2000, before shooting up 
7.3 percent per year after that. Prices in San Francisco 
went up more consistently and at a faster pace than in 
the other two markets prior to 2000, rising at a 3.7 
percent annual pace from 1980 through 2000 and then 
increasing at a 6.3 percent pace from 2000 on. Kansas 
City, on the other hand, has seen prices rise more slow-
ly in the last few years—at only a 0.9 percent annual 
rate. Some observers have taken the rapid increases 
in price in markets such as Chicago and San Francisco 
as an indication of overheated prices.8 However, these 
results do not necessarily mean that there is a housing 
bubble in San Francisco or Chicago and that housing 
prices are too low in Kansas City. They do, however, 
suggest that we need to examine prices on a local level, 
as most studies of housing do.
Literature review
A number of researchers have asked whether in-
creases in home prices or the price-to-rent ratio mean 
that prices are too high.9 One of the first studies to  
examine a large sample of home prices found that 18 1Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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Note: All dollar values are in constant 2006 dollars.
Source: National Association of Realtors from Haver Analytics.
year-to-year price changes in the 1970s and 1980s 
were correlated, and that prices at any given time did 
not fully reflect all available information, such as in-
terest rates (Case and Shiller, 1989). That left open 
the possibility that home prices in the 1980s were too 
high. Could the momentum resulting from the price 
correlation lead to a bubble?
More recent research has addressed the question 
of whether home prices are too high and whether there 
is a bubble in the context of the recent run-up in price. 
These papers typically start with a model of what home 
prices should be or how they should change. In doing 
so, the studies fall into two groups. One group decon-
structs the price of a home into its constituent parts (for 
example, Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai, 2005). The 
cost of owning a home is a function of the foregone 
interest from the funds used to buy the home; the net 
tax impact of owning, depreciation, and maintenance; 
a risk premium for owning rather than renting; and any 
transaction costs. Deducting any expected capital gains 
gives the “imputed rent,” which is an estimate of the 
benefit of living in the house plus any mispricing. If 
this imputed rent is high relative to actual rents, then 
a home can be said to be overvalued. Studies that de-
construct home prices like this typically find, at most, 
limited overpricing in the last decade (for example, 
Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai, 2005; McCarthy and 
Peach, 2004; and Smith and Smith, 2006). One issue 
with models like this is that they are sensitive to assump-
tions, especially regarding the expected capital gains.
Other studies estimate reduced-form 
models, looking for correlations between 
home prices and factors that are likely to 
influence the supply or demand for hous-
ing. For example, when incomes rise, 
households may be able to afford to spend 
more on homes. Thus, a number of stud-
ies have tested whether home prices (or 
their changes) are correlated with income 
(or its changes). In general, prices seem 
to rise with income (see, for example, Case 
and Shiller, 2003; and Lamont and Stein, 
1999).10 Other factors, such as interest 
(mortgage) rates and population, also can 
affect home prices. The limitation of pa-
pers of this type is that they are reduced 
forms rather than structural models. Thus, 
if the models are not carefully specified, 
the correlations they estimate can be spu-
rious. Still, these models find little evi-
dence of across-the-board overpricing.
Since home prices are at least partial-
ly driven by factors in a local market, virtually every 
study estimates prices at the state or metropolitan 
market level. Some studies find evidence that homes 
in selected local markets are overpriced (for example, 
Case and Shiller, 2003; and Himmelberg, Mayer, and  
Sinai, 2005), but others claim that there is not signifi-
cant overpricing (for example, McCarthy and Peach, 
2004). In the papers that found some overpricing, the 
areas where prices were estimated to be “too high” 
were often locations where the ability to build new 
houses was limited relative to demand. There is evi-
dence that zoning restrictions are associated with high 
prices and that prices may behave differently in  
“superstar” cities than in other areas (Glaeser, Gyourko, 
and Saks, 2005; and Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai, 2006). 
This brings up a related point that where homeowners 
are subject to more risk, prices may be more sensitive 
to shocks (Lamont and Stein, 1999; and Sinai and 
Souleles, 2003). Homeowners may be subject to 
more risk where homes are expensive (leading to  
homeowners having higher leverage) or where de-
mand is inelastic, such as in superstar cities (McCarthy 
and Peach, 2004). Thus, what appears to be a bubble 
in some markets might just be a reflection of normal-
ly high volatility in those markets.
The general consensus of the academic literature 
is that home prices are largely in line with fundamen-
tals. Overpriced markets, if any, are limited in num-
ber and in the scope of overpricing. This is in contrast 
to some nonacademic studies. For example, one re-
cent analysis found that markets accounting for  19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Notes: LHS means left-hand scale. RHS means right-hand scale. The  
construction of the mortgage-servicing index is described in the text.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Association 
of Realtors, Freddie Mac, and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics from Haver 
Analytics.
40 percent of all single-family home value are over-
priced by at least 34 percent (Global Insight and  
National City Corporation, 2006). Of course, this  
disparity may exist because of the lags that are com-
mon to getting academic studies published. The non-
academic studies include data through 2005 and into 
2006, while few of the academic studies include the 
more recent data. One contribution of our study is 
that we include data through midyear 2006. This 
helps us to determine whether the differences be-
tween the academic and nonacademic research are  
a function of the approach or of the period studied. 
Home prices and mortgage rates
To determine whether home prices are too high, 
we need to have an estimate of what they should be. 
In this article, we use a reduced-form model to estimate 
home prices. As a start, in this section, we explore a 
simple relationship between prices and mortgage rates. 
During the recent increase in home prices, long-
term interest rates, including mortgage rates, were de-
clining to very low levels.11 If potential homeowners 
determine the price they are willing to pay based on 
the size of the mortgage payment it generates, then 
lower interest rates can lead to higher home prices.  
To estimate this effect, we define the mortgage-ser-
vicing index (MSI) to be the ratio of the mortgage 
payment on the median-priced existing single-family 
home to the median household income, where we as-
sume that home buyers use a down pay-
ment equal to 20 percent of the purchase 
price and finance the rest of the transac-
tion with a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage 
(Rosen, 2005).12 The index reflects the 
proportion of income necessary to make 
mortgage payments, and lower values of 
the index signal that housing is more af-
fordable.13 Figure 3 graphs the MSI since 
1972, along with the average interest rate 
on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage for ref-
erence. Viewed through this lens, housing 
has become less affordable recently (that 
is, the index is higher) after a period of 
relatively affordable prices over the last 
15 years. It took about 26.8 percent of the 
median household’s income to pay the 
mortgage on a house with the median sale 
price in 2005. This was the highest value 
of the index since 1991. As mortgage rates 
have continued to trend slightly up in 
2006, the MSI has continued to rise. This 
has occurred, even though housing prices 
have begun to decline. As of June 2006, 
the MSI was approximately 28.3 percent. The last 
time the MSI was significantly higher was  
a result of the run-up in mortgage rates in the late 
1970s, after which the index remained elevated until 
mortgage rates had declined for about five years.
The past few years are somewhat reminiscent of 
the late 1970s in another way. Mortgage rates started 
rising in 1978, and real housing prices continued to 
rise for two more years. Similarly, mortgage rates have 
been inching up in the last two years, but real housing 
prices have continued to climb rapidly. This has led 
to a big increase in the MSI, indicating decreased hous-
ing affordability. One issue is whether real housing 
prices will start to decline as they did in the early 
1980s. It is important to note one big difference be-
tween the last few years and the late 1970s–early 1980s 
period: Inflation was high then and is relatively low 
now. In the earlier period, nominal housing prices rose 
but real prices fell. Now, there is much less scope for 
a decline in real prices if nominal prices do not fall. 
Since there is some belief that housing prices are slow 
to react to downward pressure, this may make a signif-
icant downward shift in real housing prices less likely.
The 1994 increases in interest rates also offer ev-
idence on—and a possible alternative for—what will 
happen to housing prices. Mortgage rates rose from 
7.3 percent in 1993 to 8.4 percent in 1994, leading to 
an increase in the MSI from 23.1 percent in 1993 to 
25.6 percent in 1994. While the higher index values 20 1Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
signaled that housing was less affordable in 1994 than 
in 1993, this quickly reversed, with affordability in-
creasing in 1995 as the index declined to 24.1 percent. 
The index remained roughly at that level through 2004, 
even as housing prices rose. Two differences between 
the mid-1990s and the late 1970s–early 1980s periods 
are that the increases in mortgage rates were tempo-
rary and that inflation did not increase. This implies 
that if the increase in mortgage rates in recent months 
is not sustained, housing affordability may revert to 
its previous level.
Model of predicted housing prices
Figure 3 suggests that housing prices might respond 
to changes in mortgage rates and income levels. This 
section introduces other factors that can help explain 
housing price changes. Our objective is to set out a 
model of predicted housing prices and use that model 
to determine whether housing prices were above their 
predicted level in the early part of this decade. Since 
housing markets are by their nature local, and examin-
ing national trends can miss important differences 
across markets, we examine local markets. As men-
tioned previously, we define local markets as metro-
politan statistical areas, and we include 43 of the 
largest MSAs in our sample. 
A number of the factors that we use to explain 
housing prices are related to each other, so we use re-
gression analysis to predict housing prices. We em-
ploy a reduced-form model similar to previous work 
(especially Case and Shiller, 2003), but with a special 
focus on mortgage affordability. The baseline empiri-
cal model is:
1)  HOME PRICE = f(AFFORDABILITY INDEX,  
  other controls),   
where we pool annual data for our 43 local markets. The 
home price series used for our results is based on the 
U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO) index (adjusted for inflation). The OFHEO 
index is a repeat sales measure of single-family home 
prices, so it is less vulnerable to changes in the stock 
of homes than is the median sale price of an existing 
home. It also is among the longest time series of home 
prices available for a large number of MSAs. To con-
vert the index to a dollar-value equivalent, we set the 
1980 value of our home price index to equal the me-
dian sale price of an existing single-family home at 
that time (the results are similar using other years, or 
the sample mean, as the base). We then compute sub-
sequent years’ index values by using the percentage 
change in the OFHEO index.
We now describe the other variables in our anal-
ysis, which, with the exception of the affordability in-
dex, are drawn from previous studies of housing prices. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample.
The affordability index is designed to be a cousin 
of the MSI. Since the MSI is calculated using home 
prices, we do not want to use it as a right-hand side 
variable in our regressions. However, we want to in-
clude the effect of interest rates on the affordability  
of a home. We define the AFFORDABILITY INDEX 
as median household income divided by the yearly 
payment on a fixed-rate 30-year $100,000 mortgage 
with a 20 percent down payment. This is inversely re-
lated to the MSI. When mortgage rates fall, the af-
fordability index increases and it becomes easier for  
a potential owner to afford a house at a given price. 
In contrast, a lower value of the MSI indicates greater 
affordability.
TaBLE 1
Summary statistics for the sample, 1980–2006
	 	 	 Standard
Variable	 Mean	 Median	 deviation
HOME PRICE (index)  161.65  137.46  79.56
AFFORDABILITY INDEX  6.71  6.62  2.13
INCOME ($ thousands)  50.19  49.22  7.02
UNEMPLOYMENT (percent)  5.55  5.24  1.89
POPULATION DENSITY (per square mile)  640.80  446.55  541.11
CONSTRUCTION COST (index)  4,210.27  4,128.19  185.34
MEDIAN AGE  33.62  33.60  2.78
Notes: The home price in year t is derived from the median price of an existing single-family home in 1980 augmented by the change in the U.S. Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s repeat-sale home index between 1980 and year t. The affordability index is the median household income 
divided by the payment on a $100,000, 20 percent down, 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. Income is the median annual household income. Construction 
cost is the Engineering News-Record’s national Building Cost Index. All variables except construction cost (and the mortgage rate) are for the local 
market. All dollar values are in constant 2006 dollars.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Association of Realtors, U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Freddie 
Mac, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Engineering News-Record, and Haver Analytics.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
In addition to the affordability index, we include 
two other measures of households’ ability to pay for a 
home. As mentioned earlier, previous studies have noted 
that prices are correlated with income (for example, 
Case and Shiller, 2003). Income enters the affordabil-
ity index, since higher incomes mean that, all else be-
ing equal, a household can afford a more expensive 
home. However, it is possible that income exerts an 
independent effect on prices. A wealthier household 
may have more disposable income and may therefore 
choose to consume more housing. For this reason, we 
include INCOME, the median household income in a 
market, as a control. Also, UNEMPLOYMENT, the 
unemployment rate in an MSA (as reported by the  
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), is included to pick 
up local economic conditions. When there is a lot of 
employment, demand for housing is likely to be high.
The population characteristics in a market may 
affect both the supply and demand for housing. A grow-
ing population may indicate an increasing demand for 
housing. Also, a densely populated market is consis-
tent with difficulties in building new housing because 
land is scarce. Hence, greater population density might 
indicate housing supply limitations. To capture this, 
we include POPULATION DENSITY, the population 
per square mile in a market, as a control variable. In 
addition, the age distribution of a population may af-
fect home prices, as different age groups have differ-
ent housing needs and may be more or less willing to 
pay for housing. We include the variable MEDIAN AGE, 
the median age of the population (available only at the 
state level), to probe such effects. 
Another factor that might influence home prices 
is the cost of construction. We use CONSTRUCTION 
COST, the national Building Cost Index published 
monthly by the Engineering News-Record. Previous 
housing studies have also used this index (Somerville, 
1999). Unfortunately, it is not available for all markets 
in our sample, so we use the national index.
Finally, there are some factors that influence home 
prices that we cannot directly control for because of 
data limitations. For example, there is evidence that 
land supply issues affect home prices. In areas with 
tight land supply, imposing strict zoning constraints 
increases prices (for example, Glaeser, Gyourko, and 
Saks, 2005). In general, the ratio of land values to home 
values affects the variability of home prices (Bostic, 
Longhofer, and Redfearn, 2006). Additionally, there 
is evidence that income dispersion can affect home 
prices (Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill, 2006). We par-
tially address these concerns by including market 
dummy variables (that is, MSA fixed effects) in many 
of our regressions. This controls for the attractiveness 
of superstar cities, as well as any land supply, zoning 
constraints, or income dispersion differences that are 
not picked up by other variables. The implicit assump-
tion is that these characteristics do not change over 
the sample period, something we return to later in  
this article.
Table 2 presents the results of regressions of 
home prices on the affordability index and controls. 
The regression in column 1 includes only the index 
on the right-hand side. The results indicate that when 
lower mortgage rates or higher income make housing 
more affordable, prices increase. The regression in 
column 2 adds in the other control variables. The co-
efficient on AFFORDABILITY INDEX is smaller in 
magnitude than in the first regression, but still posi-
tive and significant. To evaluate the economic impact 
of the index on home prices, we examine the effect 
on predicted prices when mortgage rates fall from  
10 percent to 9 percent, given a household income  
of $50,000. This change increases AFFORDABILITY 
INDEX from 5.93 to 6.47, resulting in a predicted in-
crease in HOME PRICE of 10.596 × (6.47 – 5.93) = 
5.72. At the sample mean for HOME PRICE of 161.65, 
this translates to an increase in (real) home prices of 
3.5 percent.
The other control variables in the regression gen-
erally have the expected signs. Increasing household 
income raises home prices above and beyond income’s 
indirect effect on affordability. Higher construction 
costs are partially passed through to home prices. 
Higher population density is also associated with 
higher home prices. Finally, home prices rise as the 
median age of a market falls.
The first two regressions assume that any pricing 
differences one market has compared with another 
are constant. However, it is possible that the reaction 
of the level of home prices to changes in affordability 
and income is related to how expensive housing is in 
that market. To put it another way, the level of home 
prices might be more sensitive to changes in affordabili-
ty and income in expensive superstar markets than in 
less expensive markets. To let the model permit this, 
we introduce separate affordability and income variables 
for each market (that is, we form interaction terms 
between the market dummies and AFFORDABILITY 
INDEX, and also between the market dummies and 
INCOME). The results of a regression with these  
new terms are reported in column 3 of table 2. We 
present the average values for the coefficients on  
AFFORDABILITY INDEX and INCOME, as well as 
the coefficients on the other variables. The average 
coefficients on AFFORDABILITY INDEX and  
INCOME are similar to those in the regression in  22 1Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
column 2. Moreover, these averages do not hide sig-
nificant differences across markets. No markets have 
a coefficient on AFFORDABILITY INDEX that is sig-
nificantly negative, and only two of 43 have a coeffi-
cient on INCOME that is significantly negative at the 
10 percent confidence interval. One difference be-
tween the results in this regression and those in col-
umn 2 is that the coefficients on POPULATION 
DENSITY and the MEDIAN AGE are not significant 
once we include the interaction terms.
The regression analysis allows us to examine how 
actual prices changed relative to their predicted val-
ues over our sample period. We define the price gap 
as the actual price minus the predicted price, divided 
by the predicted price. A positive price gap is a sign 
of a potentially overheated market. We use the regres-
sion in column 3 of table 2 to derive predicted prices 
(the results are similar when we use the other regres-
sions). Figure 4 charts the price gap for the 43 mar-
kets, or MSAs, in our sample. We also include a 
panel with the average price gap for all the MSAs.
Reviewing the all-market average, the first panel 
in figure 4, we see that the price gap is generally less 
than 10 percent. There also appears to be some per-
sistence in the gap, which may indicate that home 
prices are slow to adjust to changes in the economic 
and interest rate environment. The price gap reached 
its (in-sample) peak in 1991, before falling through 
1998. During the run-up in prices since 2000, actual 
prices were generally within 3 percent of their pre-
dicted levels. This implies that, on average, price 
changes in recent years were driven by changes in 
fundamentals. As we noted earlier, however, housing 
markets are local in nature, and the picture changes 
when we examine local markets.
The results presented in figure 4 show that prices 
in the last few years have been high relative to their 
predicted values in most markets. For 26 of 42 mar-
kets (excluding New Orleans), prices are above their 
predicted values, with prices exceeding predicted val-
ues by over 10 percent in 19 markets.14 In most of 
these markets, the price gap is higher since 2000 than 
at any previous time in the sample period, often 
climbing steadily from 1998 through 2006. This trend 
suggests that something may have changed around 
1998, which is consistent with the story that some 
markets became overheated at approximately the turn 
of the century.
It is important to note that 16 of 42 markets have 
prices below predicted values at the end of the sam-
ple period. Thus, to the extent that there is overpric-




	 1	 2	 3
AFFORDABILITY INDEX  13.009  10.596  8.709
  (0.000)***  (0.009)*** 
INCOME    1.812  2.023
    (0.044)** 
UNEMPLOYMENT    –2.241  –0.747 
    (0.159)  (0.687)
CONSTRUCTION COST    0.073  0.071 
    (0.003)***  (0.004)*** 
POPULATION DENSITY    0.267  0.247 
    (0.001)***  (0.206) 
MEDIAN AGE    –6.088  –3.896 
    (0.032)**  (0.250) 
Observations  1,158  1,158  1,158 
R-squared  0.764  0.822  0.906
  **Significant at the 5 percent level.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
Notes: Market dummies are included in all regressions but not shown above. In the regressions in column 3, the values listed for AFFORDABILITY 
INDEX are the average of 43 interaction terms of the index with market dummies, while the values listed for INCOME are the average of 43 interaction 
terms of household income with market dummies. Robust p values are in parentheses. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Freddie Mac, U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Engineering News-Record, and Haver Analytics.23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Freddie Mac, U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Engineering News-Record, and Haver Analytics.
rates fell through the 1990s into the new century, some 
markets, such as Rochester, New York, had constant 
or falling real prices. Thus, it is no surprise that the 
price gap became more negative in these markets. How-
ever, some markets, such as Charlotte, North Carolina, 
had prices that went up, but no faster than incomes 
did. In cases like these, lower interest rates translated 
to more affordable housing and, thus, higher predict-
ed prices. Since prices did not rise as quickly as ex-
pected, the price gap grew more negative, even as 
prices increased. The existence of rising prices alone 
does not imply that prices are overheated. 
The markets for which the price gap is the largest 
since 2000 are primarily located in California, Florida, 
and the coastal parts of the Northeast. Many of these 
markets can be characterized as centered on superstar 
cities, and the remainder are in areas of the country 
that are very attractive to live in. In addition, most of 
these markets have prices that are very volatile. Ex-
amining figure 4 shows that the ups and downs in the 
Californian and northeastern markets are more ex-
treme than in other parts of the country. Thus, if a 
bubble is defined as prices that are out of line with 
previous pricing patterns, then it is hard to say that 
there is a home price bubble in these markets.
The only other markets with prices at least 20 per-
cent above their predicted levels are Las Vegas, Seattle, 
Portland, Phoenix, and Washington, DC. For these 
markets and for Orlando and Tampa, the price gap is 
by far at its highest level in the post-2000 period. If 
there is a bubble in any of the 43 markets we study, 
the evidence suggests that it is most likely in these 
seven. Before knowing for sure  that there is a bubble, 
however, we must know whether the changes that led 
to the high price gap in these markets are temporary. 
For example, the change in affordability in Las Vegas 
occurred during a period when Las Vegas was the fast-
est growing metropolitan area in the U.S. If the new 
population is fundamentally different from long-time 
residents, then the new higher home prices could persist.
One way to discover a bubble is when it bursts. 
As noted earlier, there is some evidence that markets 
may be starting to cool. Yet, the panels in figure 4 
show that the price gap increased in many markets  29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
in 2006. This reflects the fact that mortgage rates in-
creased in 2006, but prices continued to rise in most 
markets (at least according to the OFHEO price in-
dex). However, the change in the path of mortgages 
rates in 2005 began to affect home prices in later 
2005 and into 2006. In 2005, 40 of 42 markets had an 
increase in (real) home prices, but this fell to 32 of 42 
markets in the first six months of 2006. 
One interesting question is how prices changed 
in the markets with the biggest price gap in 2004 or, 
alternatively, the largest increases in the price gap 
since 2001, compared with markets with a much low-
er price gap. If there was a bubble in those markets, 
and if the bubble was beginning to burst, then we 
should expect the high-price-gap markets to have 
seen the weakest price performance in 2006. We di-
vide the sample markets into three groups based on 
the level of the price gap in 2004 and also on the 
change in price gap from 2001 through 2004. Table 3 
presents data on how prices and the price gap 
changed for the different terciles in 2001  –04, 2005, 
and 2006. 
As mortgage rates leveled in 2005 and began to 
rise in 2006, the hottest markets continued to see 
home price increases, and the rates of increase exceed 
those in cooler markets (see table 3). To the extent 
that hot markets are considered to have price bubbles, 
there is no evidence from the data that the bubbles 
have burst. 
The regressions reported in table 2 predict the 
level of home prices as a function of the levels of the 
affordability index and the other controls. An alterna-
tive is to examine how home prices are predicted to 
change as a function of changes in the controls. This 
has an econometric advantage in some circumstances 
(such as when the home price series is nonstationary). 
To examine changes, we use: 
2)   ∆ΗΟΜΕ PRICE = f(∆AFFORDABILITY INDEX,  
  changes in the other controls), 
where we include interaction terms with the MSA 
dummies and use all the controls, as in the third re-
gression in table 2. One issue when using price changes 
is that we cannot use in-sample estimates to examine the 
differences between predicted and actual price levels 
(the form of the regression forces these values to be 
equal in the final year if they are equal in the first 
year). Instead, we estimate the model for the period 
1980–1999. We then use the regression coefficients to 
predict changes in prices from 2000 through 2006. 
Table 4 reports the results of regressions using 
equation 2 for both the full sample period 1980–2006 
and when we use data through 1999 only. The results 
are broadly consistent with the regressions in which 
we examined price levels. One interesting thing is 
that the model appears to fit better when we do not 
include the 2000–2006 data. This suggests that some-
thing might have changed in the new century.
The rapid increase in prices since 2000 is reflect-
ed in the estimated price gap for 2006. We divide 
markets into three groups based on the average price 
growth from 1980 through 1999. Table 5 reports on 
the average difference between actual and predicted 
prices in 2006 for the three groups of markets. To get 
predicted prices, we take the actual 1999 price and 
assume that subsequent changes follow the pattern 
based on the results in the estimation of equation 2 
over the period 1980–1999. As the table reports, prices 
increased much faster than predicted from 2000 through 
2006. This is true for markets where there already 
had been a big run-up in price and for markets where 
there had not been such a surge. The price gap contin-
ued to increase in 2005 and 2006. Comparing tables 3 
and 5 shows that the out-of-sample predictions using 
equation 2 imply a slower increase in prices than when 
the predictions are based on equation 1. This is likely 
because we estimated equation 1 including the post-
1999 run-up in prices. Still, neither model indicates 
that there are yet widespread changes consistent with 
a decrease in prices in markets with overvaluation. 
One cautionary point, however, is that the OFHEO 
data have yet to show the broad (if small) decreases 
in price reflected in some data (such as the median 
sale price of an existing single-family home, which, 
as noted earlier, is lower in 2006 than its peak value 
in June 2005).
Housing conditions in Seventh Federal Reserve 
district markets
In this section, we examine housing markets in the 
Seventh Federal Reserve District in more detail. The 
main sample used previously includes four Seventh 
District markets—Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, and 
Milwaukee. Now, we include results for nine additional 
markets in the region. After briefly reviewing the char-
acteristics of these markets, we look at how home prices 
in these markets have behaved relative to predictions. 
Table 6 gives summary statistics for the 13 Seventh 
District markets we examine. The first thing to notice 
is that the markets not in the main sample are a lot 
smaller than Chicago and the other markets in the 
main sample. Also, household income, and hence the 
affordability index, is slightly lower. The table also 
presents data on the median sale price of an existing 30 1Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
single-family home. Again, there are big 
differences between the large and small 
markets. The median sale price for a 
home in Chicago is nearly two times the 
price in the smaller Seventh District mar-
kets that we focus on. 
We want to estimate the price gap for 
the smaller Seventh District markets. There 
are two options for doing so: estimating 
the gap by running the baseline regres-
sion (equation 1) for the smaller markets 
or simply using the coefficients from the 
large-market regression. The choice turns 
out to matter. Population density has a 
different impact on large and small markets. 
If we use the large-market coefficients 
(those reported in column 2 of table 2) to 
estimate, we get a positive price gap that 
is increasing through 2005 for all the small 
Seventh District markets (not pictured). 
With the large-market coefficients used to 
estimate the price gap, Des Moines, Iowa; 
Davenport, Iowa; Peoria, Illinois; and 
Rockford, Illinois, have an estimated gap 
in 2005 that is comparable to the highest 
of the main sample. This may indicate 
that prices in these markets are overheat-
ed, but it likely reflects the fact that we 
are trying to predict small-market prices 
with a large-market model.
TaBLE 3




Tercile		 gap,	2004	 2001–04	 2005	 2006	 2001–04	 2005	 2006
Large price gap  7.3  10.5  13.0  11.5  16.9  6.0  11.4
Medium price gap  –1.8  4.0  5.9  7.2  –4.6  –4.3  8.9
Small price gap  –7.7  2.4  5.2  7.3  –12.0  –1.9  12.9
B.	Terciles	based	on	the	change	in	the	price	gap,	2001–04
		 	 Price	changes	(annual	rate)	 Change	in	price	gap
	 Average	change
	 in	the	price	gap,	
Tercile	 2001–04	 2001–04	 2005	 2006	 2001–04	 2005	 2006
Large price gap change  17.2  11.0  15.1  14.9  17.2  7.3  12.5
Medium price gap change  –2.3  3.8  7.3  9.5  –2.3  –1.3  11.0
Small price gap change  –14.6  2.0  1.7  1.7  –14.6  –6.2  9.7
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Freddie Mac, U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Engineering News-Record, and Haver Analytics.
TaBLE 4
Regression results for changes in price level
Dependent	variable:		∆HOME	PRICE
   
	 1980–2006	 1980–99
∆AFFORDABILITY INDEX  0.0007  0.0018
 
∆INCOME  0.0013  0.0021
 
∆UNEMPLOYMENT  –0.5661  –0.2492
  (0.584)  (0.593)
∆CONSTRUCTION COST  0.0241  0.0058
  (0.041)**  (0.154)
∆POPULATION DENSITY  0.2268  0.2386
  (0.280)  (0.007)***
∆MEDIAN AGE  –5.358  –3.961
  (0.015)**  (0.020)**
Observations  1,114  815
R-squared  0.241  0.408
  **Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at 1 percent level.
Notes: The coefficients listed for ∆AFFORDABILITY INDEX are the average of 43 
interaction terms of the change in the index with market dummies, while the  
values listed for ∆INCOME are the average of 43 interaction terms of the change  
in household income with market dummies. Robust p values are in parentheses. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Office of Federal  
Housing Enterprise Oversight, Freddie Mac, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,  
U.S. Census Bureau, Engineering News-Record, and Haver Analytics.31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TaBLE 5
Predicted versus actual home prices in 2006
	 	 	 	 	 Percent	 Percent
	 Price	change,	 Home	price	 Price	change,	 Price	gap,	 change	in		 change	in
		 1980–99		 in	1999	 2000–06	 2006	 price	gap,	 price	gap,
		 (annual	rate,	%)	 ($000)	 (annual	rate,	%)	 (percent)	 2005	 2006 
All markets  0.57  145.10  6.87  34.84  11.56  5.83
Large price change  1.67  152.93  6.65  35.61  8.52  4.38
Medium price change  0.53  140.40  7.41  36.76  13.36  4.91
Small price change  –0.49  141.98  6.55  32.15  12.79  8.21
Notes: Large, medium, and small price changes are terciles based on the rate of change in real prices from 1980 through 1999. The price gap is  
the ratio of the change in the actual price minus the change in the predicted price to the predicted price, where the predicted price is based on the 
results of the regression reported in column 2 (with the heading 1980–99) of table 4. Starting with the actual price in 1999, the predicted price is 
calculated by applying the coefficients of the regression to the actual changes in the control variables.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Freddie Mac, U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Engineering News-Record, and Haver Analytics.
TaBLE 6
Summary statistics for the Seventh Federal Reserve District sample, 1980–2006
	 	 	 	 	 Population
		 NAR	home	 Affordability	 Income	 Unemployment	 density	
	 price	($000)	 index	 ($000)	 (percent)	 (per	square	mile)
Chicago, IL  196.0  7.5  56.3  6.6  1,193.3
Detroit, MI  143.5  7.2  54.3  8.2  1,111.1
Indianapolis, IN  122.2  6.8  50.3  4.8  360.4
Milwaukee, WI  159.9  6.9  51.6  5.2  996.2
Davenport, IA   97.6a  6.2  46.5  6.7  167.3
Des Moines, IA  120.3  6.9  51.0  4.1  154.2
Grand Rapids, MI  117.3  6.9  51.5  6.5  239.6
Kalamazoo, MI   111.1a   6.2  46.9  5.8  256.0
Lansing, MI  115.7  6.7  50.2  6.0  256.1
Madison, WI  159.5  7.2  53.4  3.4  167.9
Peoria, IL  92.6  6.4  48.2  6.8  148.6
Rockford, IL  92.5  6.6  49.8  7.5  379.2
Saginaw, MI   82.4a  6.2  45.3  8.3  262.4
aNational Association of Realtors’ (NAR) home price data for Davenport start in 1992, for Kalamazoo in 1987, and for Saginaw in 1987, and these 
data all end in 2001.
Notes: All values are means. The NAR home price is based on the median (real) sale price of an existing single-family home in each market for  
1987–2006. For the Seventh Federal Reserve District markets not in the main sample, unemployment rate is measured at the state level. Also,  
there are no data for Saginaw prior to 1982. For all markets except Saginaw, the mean value of the construction cost variable is 4,210.3.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the National Association of Realtors, U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight,  
Freddie Mac, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Engineering News-Record, and Haver Analytics.
We believe that estimating the price gap using 
the coefficients from a regression of equation 1 on the 
smaller Seventh District markets provides a better al-
ternative. Figure 5 presents estimates of the price gap 
when we use the small-market regression results as the 
basis for our estimates. Recall that figure 4 shows that 
Chicago and Milwaukee currently have a slightly posi-
tive price gap, while Detroit has a price gap of essen-
tially zero, and Indianapolis has a negative gap. Figure 5 
shows that the price gap in the smaller Seventh District 
markets shares much more in common with Milwaukee 
than with the other large markets. The price gap does 
not bounce around very much and is generally close 
to zero from 2000 on. This is evidence against the no-
tion that these markets are extremely underpriced or 
overpriced.
The results for the smaller Seventh District mar-
kets offer several lessons. First, there does not appear 
to be a bubble in any of the Seventh District markets. 
Second, there is some evidence that home prices in 
the smaller markets may, to a certain extent, react to 
different factors than those in larger markets. Prices 
also appear less volatile in these markets. Perhaps 
this finding is due to the fact that few small markets 
can be considered superstar cities.32 1Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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The rapid rise of real estate prices in recent years 
has led some people to fear that we are in the midst  
of a real estate bubble. This article examines single-
family home prices and shows that these prices have 
indeed increased, but much of the increase has come 
at a time when mortgage rates were declining and in-
comes were rising.15 We present a simple mortgage-
servicing index, which indicates that these two factors 
kept housing affordability in the United States as a 
whole fairly constant for roughly the decade ending 
in 2004 as home prices increased. It was only after 
2004 that affordability declined.
We estimate a simple model of home prices to 
control for other factors that can affect home prices. 
This model shows that while housing remained afford-
able, prices in many markets increased more rapidly 
than the model predicted. This price gap, as we call 
it, grew to over 20 percent in some markets, especial-
ly in superstar markets, such as San Francisco and 
New York. These markets are not always indicative of 
conditions in the rest of the country, however. There 
were some markets, especially those in the interior of 33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIguRE 5 (ConTInuEd)

























Note: The Seventh Federal Reserve District comprises all of Iowa and most of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Freddie Mac,  
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, Engineering News-Record, and Haver Analytics.
the country, in which prices were below their predict-
ed levels in the first half of the 2000s. Thus, if there 
was a bubble, it was likely limited in geographical 
scope. Still, since the superstar markets are many of 
the largest markets in the country, any rapid change 
in housing prices in these markets could have impli-
cations for the U.S. economy as a whole.
One limitation of this article, and thus of any con-
clusions, is that housing data series are typically an 
average or a median for a market. Thus, there may be 
trends in housing prices for particular segments of the 
market that are missed by this or any similar analyses. 
For example, the most expensive homes in a market 
may be more vulnerable than the average home to 
changes in mortgage rates. If so, then prices for these 
homes might moderate more when rates rise.
Another limitation is that the mortgage-servicing 
index assumes that borrowers use a traditional fixed-
rate mortgage. Some purchasers may use more aggressive 
financing options, such as interest-only mortgages 
with balloon payments. As mortgage rates rise, these 
borrowers may feel greater pressure to sell than those 
with more traditional mortgages. In addition, as then-
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noted in 
2005, there has been an increase in the share of 
homes purchased for investment.16 Again, speculators 
may be quicker to sell if house prices start to weaken. 
This could put additional downward pressure on pric-
es in some markets.
Finally, there is anecdotal and some empirical 
evidence that home prices are starting to decline on a 
widespread basis after a long period of increases. 
This decline, if any, is not present in the home price 
data we use. If it presages the return of prices to their 
“normal” levels, our modeling suggests that there 
could be significant corrections in some markets.34 1Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
1According to Dow Jones’s Factiva electronic indexing service, 
more than 4,000 articles in U.S. publications mentioned the term 
“housing bubble” in 2005 compared with three in 2000.
2We show evidence of this in figure 1.
3The Seventh Federal Reserve District comprises all of Iowa and 
most of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
4We use the Consumer Price Index less shelter as our deflator.
5Often the claim that there is a bubble is based on an increase in 
prices. However, even if prices are too high, there may not be a bub-
ble. According to Edward Leamer, a professor at the University of 
California, Los Angeles, the term “bubble” might be a misnomer, 
since housing price declines are “very slow, painful processes” 
(Abate, 2005).
6See, for example, Foderaro et al. (2006) and Corkery (2006). 
7Other rent indexes give similar results.
8See, for example, Simon and Smith (2005), who look at a similar 
buy versus rent comparison.
9Many nonacademic sources also address this question. For  
example, National City Bank publishes the results of a valuation 
model (www.nationalcity.com/corporate/EconomicInsight/ 
HousingValuation/default.asp), and Moody’s produces similar esti-
mates (www.economy.com).
10Gallin (2003) finds no co-integration between home prices and 
income, but this may be because he ignores the effect of interest 
rates on prices.
11After declining through 2002, mortgage rates moved in a narrow 
range for some years before beginning to rise in late 2005 and into 
2006.
12The median home price is from the National Association of Realtors, 
and median household income is as reported by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.
13The MSI does not take into account changes in the quality of housing 
(including changes in the size of a home). Thus, the consumption 
value of housing can increase even as the MSI remains constant. 
14We do not include data for New Orleans for 2005 and 2006 (that 
is, after Hurricane Katrina).
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